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NOTES
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF MENTAL STATE
OBSERVATIONS OBTAINED DURING
UNLAWFUL CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION:
DRAWING THE LINE ON THE REAL OR
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DISTINCTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that ludo person .. shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."' Since its landmark decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court has attempted
to secure this privilege against self-incrimination by prohibiting the
use at trial of any testimony or communications made by a defen-
dant during custodial interrogation.' A judge may only admit such
testimony or communications if the prosecution can demonstrate
that it employed effective procedural safeguards in obtaining the
evidence." These safeguards consist of the "Miranda warnings" that
inform an accused of his or her rights to remain silent and to have
an attorney present during any custodial interrogation.' At the same
time, however, another line of' cases has emerged which holds that
the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend
to certain types of "real or physical evidence," which the police may
obtain from a defendant without implicating the fifth amendment.'
' U.S. Co:oil . . amend. V.
2 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id.
Id. In the absence or other effective means, the Miranda Co urt required;
Ipirior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive	 these rights, provided the waiver is made vOl-
untarily, knowingly and intelligently.
ht.
So!, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
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In Jones v. Dugger, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit recently considered whether impressions of a de-
fendant's mental state obtained during unlawful custodial interro-
gation were admissible as such real or physical evidence!' In holding
the evidence admissible, the court placed itself in direct conflict with
the decisions of other circuit courts on this issue, including the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Gholson v. Estelle,' and the District of Columbia
Circuit's holding in United States v. Hinchley. 8 Both of these circuit
courts had decided that evidence of a defendant's mental state or
demeanor should be excluded when based on a witness's conver-
sations with that defendant in violation of Miranda." The majority
in Jones declined to deal squarely with the conflict, instead relying
on its own interpretation of what constitutes protected testimony or
communications under Miranda.'"
All of the circuits that have addressed this issue appear to accept
the distinction between testimonial evidence and real or physical
evidence outlined in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Schmerber v. California." Under this distinction, a Fifth amendment
violation occurs when police compel testimony or communications
from an accused without giving the Miranda warnings, but no vio-
lation occurs when only real or physical evidence is compelled with-
out prior warnings. 12 Once this distinction is drawn, the question
then becomes: on which side of the dividing line should a particular
type of evidence be placed? In Jones, the Eleventh Circuit placed
observations of a defendant's mental state obtained during unlawful
questioning on the permissible side of the line," despite persuasive
authority to the contrary from the other circuits. 14
This note analyzes the reasoning underlying the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's holding in Jones v. Dugger, and examines whether such rea-
soning represents a significant departure from the Supreme Court's
current standards regarding the privilege against self-incrimination.
6 839 F.2d 1441,1441 (11th Cir.), (44a. denied, 109 S. Ct. 91 (1988).
See Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734.742 (5th Cir. 1982).
See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115,125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
" See Gholson, 675 F.2d at 742; Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 125-26.
l° See Jones, 839 F.2d at 1444-46 & n.7.
" See id. at 1443-44; Gholson, 675 F.2d at 739-40; Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 123-26.
12 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. The Court referred to "[L]he distinction which had emerged
that the [filth amendment] privilege is a hat. against compelling 'communications' or
'testimony' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or
physical evidence' does not violate 	 Id.
"Jones, 839 F.2d at 1444.
14 See Gholson, 675 F.2d at 739-40; Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 123-26.
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Section I initially explores the post -Schmerber distinction between
testimonial and real or physical evidence in light of the policies
underlying the Miranda decision.'' This section then examines how
courts have interpreted these Miranda policies in classifying various
types of evidence, including blood samples, handwriting samples,
and voice exemplars, as either communicative or real or physical.' 6
It concludes with a discussion of the specific issue of mental state
evidence and its treatment by the courts prior toJones. 17 Section II
analyzes in detail the majority and the dissenting opinions in Jones,
and the court's departure from the developing standards regarding
mental state evidence under Gholson and Hinckley. 18 Section III then
examines the current conflict among the circuits on the issue of
mental state observations and the underlying confusion as to what
the appropriate constitutional protections against self-incrimination
should be.' 9 This note concludes that the Eleventh Circuit wrongly
decided Jones v. Dugger under the original policies and protections
of Miranda and suggests that the Supreme Court provide the circuits
with a more precise definition of those kinds of evidence that are
"testimonial" or "communicative" for purposes of the fifth amend-
ment. 2 "
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REAL OR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
DISTINCTION
A. The Emergence of the Distinction: Miranda and Schmerber
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona repre-
sented an attempt to provide a clear-cut set of procedural safe-
guards to preserve the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 ' In Mi-
randa, the Court discussed in great detail the constitutional values
embodied in the fifth amendment, and the types of activities that
would threaten these values. 2  A careful examination of these values
and their subsequent. interpretation by the Court in Schmerber v.
13 See .infra notes 21-56 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text.
j2 See infra notes 112-53 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 154-209 and accompanying text.
l" See infra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text,
21 384 U,S. 436,44042 (1966). See generally L, LEVY, ORIGINS OF TIIE 1 : 11.711 AMENDMENT:
Tin,: RIGHT AGAINST SELF-ItsatimtsrATiorq (1968).
22 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-60; see also Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal
Prosecution: Some Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VANO. L. REV, 501 (1987).
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California aids in the analysis of how the Court came to place some
types of evidence outside the scope of the privilege.
The Miranda Court was greatly concerned with the coercive
nature of custodial police interrogation." The defendants in Mi-
randa, which was in fact a collection of four separate cases decided
together, were each subjected to incommunicado interrogation in
the custody of the police. 24 None of the defendants received a full
and effective warning of their rights at the outset of the interro-
gation process. 25 In all four cases, the police elicited oral admissions
from the defendants, and three of them signed statements as wel1. 26
The prosecution used all of these incriminating statements against
the defendants at trial. 27
In determining that custodial interrogation was by its nature
inherently coercive," the Miranda Court examined a variety of corn-.
mon police techniques of custodial interrogation. 29 The Court
found that many of the techniques induced individuals to commu-
nicate with the police where they might otherwise have remained -
silent." For example, the Court considered two factual studies, the
1931 Wickersham Report to Congress by a Presidential Commission
and the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights Report., both of which
emphasized that police brutality and the "third degree" still flour-
ished as a means of extorting confessions. 3 ' The Court was dis-
turbed by these techniques not only because of their flagrant law-
lessness but also because of their tendency to elicit false confessions
and to induce laziness in police officers searching for objective
evidence. 32 The Court also noted that these techniques damaged
the public image of law enforcement and the administration of
justice."
25 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58.
24 id. at 456-57.
"Id. at 457•
2" Id. at 445.
27 Id.
"Id. at 457-58.
29 Id. at 445-58.
5° Id. at 456-57. The Court noted that "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals .... In other
settings, these individuals might have exercised their constitutional rights." Id. at 455-56.
31 Id, at 445-46 (citing IV NATIONAL COMMISSION ON' LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-
MENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) thereinafter WICKERSHAM RE-
PORT']; 1961 COMM O N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., jusucE, pt. 5, 17).
" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447-48 (quoting WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 31).
93 Id.
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In addition, the Miranda Court recognized that much incom-
municado interrogation is aimed at psychological rather than phys-
ical control over the defendant." Reviewing various police manuals
and texts documenting successful interrogation procedures, the
Court found that to a large extent the mere fact of being questioned
by police officers in isolated and unfamiliar surroundings renders
the accused more psychologically vulnerable."' The manuals studied
by the Court contained numerous examples of additional tech-
niques aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of such interrogation.
For example, the police may use a false lineup in which a previously-
coached witness confidently identifies the accused in front of the
interrogating officers."" Another technique, known as the "Mutt and
Jeff" act, employs two police officers, one acting as the relentless
investigator (Mutt) and the other as a kindhearted family man ( Jeff )
who wants to help the defendant but cannot stave off Mutt for
long." After interrogating the defendant for awhile, Mutt leaves
the room and Jeff pleads with the defendant, to "cooperate." Be-
cause such techniques rob individuals of their freedom of choice,
the Court found them to be "at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles" — the privilege against self-incrimination —
and thus necessitating adequate protective devices to restore to a
defendant his or her freedom of choice."
The Court next examined the historical origins of the fifth
amendment privilege. According to the Miranda Court, the original
principle centered around the proper scope of governmental power
over the individual," and extended as far as necessary to protect
the individual's rights.'" Thus, to preserve these individual liberties,
the Court required the government to procure the evidence needed
to convict an accused by its own efforts, and not "by the cruel,
34 Id. at 448.
Id. at 449-59 (citing INIIAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962);
O ' HARA, FUNDAMEN'T'ALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (195(i)).
$6 Id. at 453 (citing O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL. INVESTIGATION 105-06 (1956)).
34 Id. at 452 (citing !MIMI & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CoNFEssioNs 58-59
(1962); O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL. INTERROGATION 104 (1956)).
3" M. at 457-58.
39 Id. at 460. The Court stated that "plhose who framed uur Cinistitution and the Bill
of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that
'illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing ... by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.'" Id. at 459 (quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)); see also Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecutitm:
Some Cemstitutional Premises and Plat:tires in Transition, 35 VANn. L. REv, 501 (1987).
"Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459-00 (citing Counselnian v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892) (privilege is "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard")),
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simple expedient of compelling it from [a defendant's] own
mouth." 91 By guaranteeing an individual's right to remain silent
until he or she freely and voluntarily chose to speak, the Court
upheld the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 42
The Miranda Court was careful not only to construct effective
safeguards to insure the Fifth amendment privilege, but also to detail
the reasons behind such safeguards. In this way, the Court could
use the same analysis to review any police measures subsequently
challenged by an accused and determine whether such techniques
met the constitutional standards. In fact, only one week after hand-
ing down the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court undertook pre-
cisely this type of analysis in Schmerber v. California, considering
whether the taking of blood from an arrestee over his objection to
provide evidence of intoxication violated the fifth amendment priv-
ilege.'"
The defendant in Schmerber was arrested at a hospital while
being treated for injuries suffered in an automobile accident in
which he had apparently been driving."" A physician at the hospital
withdrew a blood sample from the defendant, without his consent,
at the direction of the police. Analysis of this sample revealed a
blood alcohol content that indicated intoxication:' 5 The report of
this analysis was subsequently admitted at trial. The defendant ob-
jected to the admission of this evidence on a number of grounds,
including violation of his fifth amendment rights.
In considering the fifth amendment claim, the Court first noted
that requiring the defendant to submit to the test could be construed
as an attempt to compel him to testify against himself, because the
test was an attempt by the police to discover incriminating evi-
dence:1 n Turning to the reasoning of Miranda, the Schmerber Court
admitted that the compelled extraction of blood from an individual
does not fully preserve the individual's freedom by requiring the
state to procure evidence against him or her by its own efforts."
Under Miranda, the Court recognized that this compulsion might.
4 ' Id. at 460 (quoting Chambers v. Horida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)).
42 id. (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (1964)). In Molloy v. Hogan, the Court stated
that the privilege is fulfilled only When the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unlettered exercise of his own will." 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
" 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966). See generally Note, Conmitutional Limilalthns on the Thking
of Body Evidence, 78 YALE L.J. 1074 (1969).
ra Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 758.
X 5 14. at 759.
14. at 761.
17 Id. at 702.
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then allow the state to burden unconstitutionally the defendant's
rights.
The Schmerber Court then proceeded, however, to examine the
pre-Miranda interpretation of the Fifth amendment to determine
the proper scope of its protections." The Court concluded that the
privilege was limited, both historically and implicitly under Miranda,
to those situations in which the state compelled an individual to
testify directly to his or her guilt, 49 citing its decisiorrin Holt v. United
States as the leading case on this issue." In Holt, the police obtained
identification evidence by compelling the accused, prior to lineup
proceedings, to put on a certain blouse believed to belong to him."'
Determining that the blouse fit the defendant, the trial court sub-
sequently admitted this fact as evidence against the accused. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in Holt, holding
that the fifth amendment prohibited the use of compelled com-
munications against an accused, but did not require the exclusion
of his or her body when it was material evidence.' 2 In fact, the Hatt
Court concluded that to find a fifth amendment violation in that
case would be an "extravagant: extension" of the constitutional pro-
tections."'
The Schmerber Court thus reached the conclusion that the fifth
amendment protects an accused's "testimony" or "communications"
whatever form it may take, but that the privilege does not extend
to compulsion making an accused the source of "real or physical
evidence." 54 Because the blood test evidence was neither the defen-
dant's testimony nor evidence related to a communicative act of his,
the Schmerber Court found it to be outside the scope of the fifth
amendment and, as such, admissible.'' The Court also held that, in
those cases where the distinction could not readily be drawn, the
4" Id. at 762-63.
1" Id. at 762.
5° Id. at 763 (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,252-53 (1910)).
5 ' 218 U.S. at 252-53.
52 Id. Specifically, the Court stated that "the prohibidon of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material." Id.; see also 8 %YR:molly, EvtoExcE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (privilege
limited to "testimonial disclosures ... directed at the employment of legal process to extract
from the person's ow lips an admission of guilt").
" 218 U.S. at 252.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 703-64. But see Dann, The Fifih Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence From a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. Rev. 597 (1970).
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
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purpose of the procedure might indicate whether the responses
elicited were purely physiological or, in fact, essentially testimonial. 56
Under Schmerber, therefore, the two tests which evidence must sat-
isfy to be classified as real or physical are: first, that the evidence
was not "substance-based"; and second, that it was not "purposely-
elicited" as a testimonial response. Taken together, the decisions in
Miranda and Schmerber thus define the scope of the constitutional
privilege and the limitations that the courts may impose on it.
B. How Courts Have Applied the Schmerber Distinction
Prior to the decisions in Miranda and Schmerber, state and lower
federal courts had developed a line of cases exempting certain
classes of evidence from constitutional protection." These classes
included the compulsion of a defendant "to submit to fingerprint-
ing, photographing or measurements, to write or speak for identi-
fication, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk,
or to make a particular gesture." 58 Following the Supreme Court's
explicit creation of the real or physical evidence distinction, how-
ever, the courts decided a number of cases that helped to clarify
the boundaries of this classification. .
One year after Schmerber, the Supreme Court upheld the ad-
missibility of identification evidence - obtained through post-indict-
ment lineup proceedings in the case of United States v. Wade. 59 The
defendant in Wade was charged with conspiring to rob a bank and
with robbery."" Two bank employees who had witnessed the robbery
identified the defendant in a lineup. Applying the Schmerber stan-
dard, the Court reasoned that placing the accused in a lineup in-
volved only his physical characteristics, and did not require him to
provide any evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."'
5" Id. at 764. The Court stated that those tests that obtain more than simply physical
evidence "evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment ... call[ing] to mind the
principle that the protection ... is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.'"
Id. (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 192 U.S. 547,562 (1892)).
' 7 Id.
5 ' Id.; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 52, § 2265.
" 388 U.S. 218,222-23 (1967).
"Id. at 220.
Id. at 221-22. The Court stated:
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for
observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of
the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion or
the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose
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Thus, the Wade Court found no fifth amendment violation in the
defendant's compelled participation in the lineup." 2
Similarly, in Gilbert v. California, a case argued with Wade, the
Court found no constitutional violation in the admission of hand-
writing exemplars taken from the defendant following his arrest." 3
The defendant in Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and
murder of a police officer during the robbery. He refused to answer
questions about the robbery with which he was charged, but later
answered questions about some other robberies in the area in which
the robber had used a handwritten note to demand the money.' "'
The Court ruled that, although handwriting is a means of com-
munication, the samples were taken only as an identifying physical
characteristic."' Because the state did not seek to use the samples
for their communicative content, the Court held that they were not
testimonial and thus fell outside the fifth amendment's protec-
tions."
The Court likewise classified the compelled production of voice
exemplars as real or physical evidence in United States v. Dionisio. 1 i 7
In Dionisio, the police asked the defendant to furnish a voice ex-
emplar as part of a grand jury investigation for violations of federal
gambling statutes. The grand jury had received in evidence certain
voice recordings, and had subpoenaed approximately twenty per-
sons, including the defendant, to obtain voice exemplars for com-
parison with the recordings." 8 The Court began its analysis of this
issue by recognizing that the state may compel an accused to display
identifiable physical characteristics without implicating the privilege
against self-incrimination."• Citing the decisions in both Wade and
Gilbert, the Court concluded that the voice recordings were used
only for measuring physical properties of the defendant's voice, not
any knowledge he might have. It is no different from compelling Scluncrber to
provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse...
Id. at 222.
62 Id. at 223.
a' 388 U.S. 263,266-67 (1967).
69 Id. at 265-66.
"5 Id. at 266-67.
14 Id.; see also United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19,22 (1973) (no filth amendment violation
where specific and narrowly drawn directive to furnish handwriting sample involved pro-
duction of physical characteristics only).
17 410  U.S. 1,6-7 (1973).
" Id. at 2-3.
' Id. at 5-6.
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for any testimonial or communicative content of what was said.7 °
For these reasons, the Court found no fifth amendment violation.
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the admissibility
of blood test results in the 1983 decision of South Dakota v. Neville. 71
In Neville, moreover, the Court extended its previous ruling in
Schmerber, holding that a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood
alcohol test may be admitted as evidence of his or her guilt without
offending the fifth amendment privilege. 72 In NeVille, the defendant
was arrested for drunk driving after running a stop sign and then
failing two field sobriety tests."' The police asked him to submit to
a blood alcohol test as required under the South Dakota "implied
consent" law,''' but the defendant refused, stating "I'm too drunk,
I won't pass the test."' He refused two subsequent requests by the
police, maintaining that he was too drunk to pass. Although South
Dakota law specifically provided that such refusals may be admis-
sible at trial, the defendant successfully had the evidence of his
refusals suppressed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
this suppression on fifth amendment grounds.'"
The Neville Court first upheld the constitutionality of the South
Dakota statutory scheme as a means of furthering the important
7" Id. at 6-7 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (19117); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967)).
Tt 459 U.S. 551, 559 (1983). See generally Casenote, Constitutional Law — Self Incrimination
— Caution! Refusal to Take a Blood-Alcohol Test May Be Hazardous to Your Trial—South Dakota
v. Neville, 12 FI.A. Sr. U.L. REV. 167 (1984); Casenote, South Dakota v. Neville: Refusal to
Submit to a Blood-Alcohol Test as Evidence of Intoxication, 37 ARK. L. RE v. 702 (1984); Casenote,
Constitutional Law—Admissibility of Refusal to Submit to Blood-Alcohol Test and the Fifth Amendment:
South Dakota v. Neville, 17 CumourroN L. REV. 203 (1983).
72 Neville, 459 U.S. at 561-64. The Court found that this question had been left open in
Schmerber, which had decided only whether a compelled blood test was itself testimonial or
communicative. Id. at 554 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966)). The
Schmerber Court had indicated that an accused may incriminate him or herself when refusing
to submit to a blood test in a way that would require this testimonial product of administering
the test to be excluded. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9; see also Arenella, Schmerber and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 2(} Am. CRIM. L. REV. 31 (1982); Note, The
Admission of Refusals in Drunk Driving Prosecutions; A Violation of the Fifth Amendment, 10 l'Ac.
L.J. 141 (1978).
73 459 U.S. at 554-55.
74 Id. at 555, 559. This "implied consent" law deems anyone operating a vehicle in South
Dakota to have consented to a chemical test of his or her blood if arrested for driving while
intoxicated. Id. at 559 (citing S.D. CoomEn LAws ANN. § 32.23-10 (Supp. 1982)); see also
Rumrell, Wright, & Havens, The Case for Admissibility of Blood Alcohol 'Test Results in Civil and
Criminal Trials: The Florida Implied Consent Law v. The Florida Accident Report, 55 FLA. R.J. 362
(1981).
75
 Neville, 459 U.S. at 555-56.






governmental and societal interests in deterring drunk driving."
The Court reasoned that, because blood tests constituted only real
or physical evidence under Schmerber, arrestees were not being
forced to make an unconstitutional choice.'" In the same way, then,
the Court held that refusal to submit to the test is not constitution-
ally protected. Next, the Court concluded that no impermissible
coercion occurred in an arrestee's refusal to submit to the test, and,
therefore, it was not an act protected by the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. 79 The Court thus left unanswered the
question of whether refusing to submit to a blood test was a testi-
monial or merely a physical act."
In addition to these cases involving physical characteristics,
another line of cases has developed in recent years regarding the
admissibility of evidence obtained from suspects during compelled
psychiatric examinations. In Estelle v. Smith, the Supreme Court
affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's
holding that a defendant's fifth amendment rights are violated when
he or she is compelled to speak to a psychiatrist who can later use
the defendant's statements against him or her at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial." The defendant in Estelle was indicted in
Texas for capital murder, with the state seeking the death penalty."2
He underwent a court-ordered psychiatric examination to deter-
mine his competence to stand trial, although defense counsel had
put into issue neither that competency nor his sanity at the time of
the offense." After being examined by Dr. James Grigson for ninety
"Id. at 558-59.
76 hl. at 563.
79 Id. at 562. The Neville Court outlined the argument for suppression — that refusal is
actually a tacit expression of a defendant's thoughts and thus protected communication —
and the argument against suppression — that refusal is merely a physical act similar to other
nontestimonial evidence — but rested its decision on neither of these arguments. Id. at 560—
62.
" Id. at 561-62.
B1 Smith v. Estelle, 602 1:.2d 694,707-08 (5th Cir. 1979), aff 'd, 45! U.S. 454,469 (1981).
See generally easenote, Estelle v. Smith; Extending- the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Use
of Psychiatric Examinations in Texas Death Penalty Proceedings, 22 S. TEx. LT 355 (1982); Supreme
Court Says Fifth and Sixth Amendments Protect Use of Psychiatric Testimony in Limited Circumstances,
5 MENTAL  DISABILITY L. REV. 231 (1981); Self-Incrimination and Psychiatric Testimony l Prediction
of Future Dangerousness, 5 MENTAL DISABUSES' L. REV. 229 (1981).
62
 45 1 U.S. at 456.
63 Id. at 456-57 & n. i. The trial judge stated that he ordered the examination simply to
assure that the defendant was mentally competent before allowing him potentially to receive
the death penalty. Id. at 457 n.l.
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minutes in jail, the defendant was found competent to stand trial."
He was tried by a jury and convicted of murder.
Under the Texas system of bifurcated proceedings in capital
cases, the court then held a separate proceeding before the same
jury to determine the punishment. 85 The jury had to resolve three
critical issues, one of which was whether the defendant would prob-
ably commit future criminal acts constituting a continuing threat to
society (i.e. his future dangerousness). 88 Based on his ninety-minute
mental status examination, Dr. Grigson, the state's only witness at
this proceeding, testified as to the defendant's sociopathic condition
and the fact that he would continue to commit the same or similar
criminal acts if given the opportunity. 87 The jury answered the three
questions affirmatively, and the judge imposed the mandatory death
penalty on the defendant. 88
After exhausting his state remedies, the defendant petitioned
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
for habeas corpus relief. Because the defendant was not warned of
his right to remain silent prior to the examination and the defense
counsel was not notified in advance that Dr. Grigson would testify,
the district court ruled that the admission of the psychiatrist's tes-
timony had violated the defendant's fifth, sixth, eighth, and four-
teenth amendment rights. 89
 Thus, the court vacated the death sen-
tence. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the
same constitutional grounds, holding specifically that no evidence
1,4451 U.S. at 457.
"Id. Under Article 37.07 f (a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, once a defendant
is found guilty of a capital offense, a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to deter-
mine whether to impose the death sentence or life imprisonment. Id. at 457 n.2 (citing TEX.
CIUM. PROC. CODE ANN. 37.071(a) (Vernon 1980)). All evidence "relevant to sentence" may
be presented, and both the state and the defense may argue for or against a sentence of
death. Id. Nothing in this statutory scheme, however, "shall . . . be construed to authorize
the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States
or of the State of Texas." Id. See generally Crump, Capital Murder: The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous.
L. REv. 531 (1977).
Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457-58. The other two issues are first, whether the defendant's
conduct was deliberate and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
or another would result; and second, if raised by the evidence, whether the defendant's
conduct was unreasonable in response to any provocation by the deceased. Id. at 458 n.3
(quoting TEx. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.071(b),(c) (c) (Vernon 1980)). If the jury
affirmatively answers all three questions, which the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, then the judge must sentence the defendant to death. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 457-58.
x7
	 at 459-60.
" Id. at 460.
81 ' Id.; see Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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based on a psychiatric examination may be used without prior warn-
ings.""
In its review of these decisions, the Supreme Court initially
recognized that the fifth amendment privilege applied equally to
the penalty as well as the guilt phase of a capital murder trial.•'
The Court then found the privilege to be directly involved in this
case because the psychiatric testimony was based on the substance
of the defendant's disclosures during the examination and not sim-
ply on observations of the defendant. Under the Court's analysis,
such use of the defendant's own statements to assist the state in
establishing future dangerousness and obtaining the death penalty
undoubtedly implicated the privilege."2 Without the necessary safe-
guards of an appraisal of his rights and the knowing waiver thereof,
the Court concluded that the defendant could not have freely and
voluntarily made his statements during the court-ordered custodial
psychiatric examination.• The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed
the lower court's holding on fifth amendment grounds." 4
At the same time, however, the Estelle Court noted that, had
the prosecution limited the use of the psychiatrist's findings to the
scope of a routine competency examination to ensure that the de-
fendant understood the charges and could assist in his defense, the
findings would not have implicated the fifth amendment."' In ad-
dition, the Court distinguished the examination from a sanity ex-
amination ordered in response to a defendant's insanity plea. Ac-
cording to the Court, the prosecution may require a defendant to
submit to a sanity examination once he or she has raised the insanity
defense, because holding otherwise might deprive the state of its
only means of disproving the defense raised by the defendant."" In
"" Estelle, 451 U.S. at 461; see Smith v, Estelle, 602 F.2d 694,696 (5th Cir. 1979).
" Estelle, 451 U.S. at 461-63, The Court stated, "(Oven the gravity of the decision to
be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe funda-
mental constitutional guarantees." Id. at 463.
92 Id, at 466; see Griffith & Griffith, The Patient's Right ID Protection Against Self-Incrimination
During the Psychiatric Examination (Symposium: Response to Crime), 13 U. Tot.. L. Riw. 269
(1982); Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination:
An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARY. L. Rev. 648 (1970).
" Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469.
" Id. at 469,473-74.
95 Id. at 465.
96 Id, According to the Court:
When a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psy-
chiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means
it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case.
Accordingly. several Courts of Appeals have held that under such circuin-
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Estelle, however, the Court ruled that Dr. Grigson had conducted
the examination for neither of those purposes, and thus it remained
open to constitutional attack. 97
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith,
the Fifth Circuit in Battie v. Estelle faced the question of whether
the court could apply the Estelle decision retroactively to overturn
a death sentence based in part upon psychiatric testimony regarding
the defendant's future dangerousness." In Battie, the Texas state
trial court had convicted the defendant of capital murder; prior to
trial, a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist had examined him, at
his request, to determine his competency to stand trial. The pros-
ecution later used the psychologist's testimony at the penalty stage
to establish that the defendant was a sociopath who would constitute
a continuing threat to society.`'`' The defendant challenged this use
of the psychiatric testimony as a violation of his fifth amendment
privilege, ultimately reaching the circuit court on a writ of habeas
corpus. um
The Fifth Circuit first considered the question of the retroactive
applicability of the Estelle holding." The court applied the standard
that a principle which is not new, but only restates existing law or
applies established law to a novel set of facts, may be retroactively
enforced.'°2 The court concluded that, although no previous cases
bad held that Miranda warnings were necessary prior to a compelled
psychiatric examination, the Estelle decision represented only an
extension of the Miranda principles regarding the inherent dangers
of custodial interrogation to the new factual situation of psycholog-
ical examinations, thus requiring retroactive effect.'"
stances, a defendant can be required to submit to a sanity examination con-
ducted by the prosecution's psychiatrist.
Id.
17 Id. at 466.
Bailie, 655 F.2d 692, 696 (501 Cir. 1981).
99 Id. at 695. The psychologist's tests did not elicit any facts about the crime, but consti-
tuted a diagnostic evaluation of the defendant from which the doctor concluded the defen-
d-ant suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder,
1 "1 Id. at 695-96.
1 ° 1 Id. at 696.
1 D 2 Id. at 697. Reviewing the applicable cases, the court determined that this issue of
retroactivity should be governed by a two-part standard: first, "whether the principle in
question is new or is simply a restatement of already established principles and the application
of those principles to a particular set of facts" and second, "an evaluation of ... the purpose
of the new ruling, the extent to which law enforcement authorities may have relied upon
the previous state of the law, and the impact of a retroactive application ... on the admin-
istration or justice." Id. (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967)).
Bathe, 655 l'.2d at 699.
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The court then applied the holding of Estelle to the Battle case,
and ruled that the psychiatric testimony constituted testimonial ev-
idence based on the content of the defendant's responses.'" As in
Estelle, the court noted that a routine competency examination
would not itself violate the fifth amendment privilege. Use of the
examination to determine a defendant's culpability or responsibility,
however, did infringe on the defendant's right not to incriminate
himself under the Court's analysisi° 5 Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the defendant had not waived his privilege against self-
incrimination by requesting the psychiatric examination, as he had
done so only to determine competency and not for the separate
purpose of establishing future dangerousness.'" For these reasons,
the Battle court set aside the defendant's death sentence.' 07
Thus, a variety of cases decided since Miranda and Schmerber
have helped the courts to define and clarify the scope of the "real
or physical" distinction under the fifth amendment. The courts have
found certain evidence, such as blood samples and participation in
lineup proceedings, to be readily classified as real or physical evi-
dence because they involve none of a defendant's communications
or testimonial acts.'" Other types of evidence, including voice ex-
emplars and handwriting samples, present a more difficult question
because they are more closely related to a defendant's testimonial
or communicative capacities.'"9 Ultimately, however, the courts etas-
'"4 Id. at 699-700.
' 11 ' Id. at 701.
t°6 Id. at 702-03. The Battle court cited United States v. Cohen as an example of when a
defendant's request l'or psychiatric evaluation would constitute such a waiver, Id. at 701-02
(citing United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976)). The
Battle court explained that because the defendant in Cohen used the psychiatric evidence to
raise a mental defense, the court in that case allowed the prosecution to use similar psycho-
logical evidence to respond to the defense. Id. The court in Battle distinguished its holding
by stating that merely submitting to a psychiatric examination, without attempting to intro-
duce expert testimony as to mental health, does not constitute a waiver of the filth amendment.
privilege by a defendant. Id.
10 Id. at 703; see also Jones v. McCotter, 767 F.2d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1985) (Estelle applied
retroactively to overturn death sentence where psychiatric evidence based on testimonial
communications between defendant and Drs. Crigson and Holbrook was admitted at pun-
ishment phase in violation of defendant's fi fth amendment rights); Muniz v. Procunier, 760
F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1985) (retroactive application of Estelle required reversal of death
sentence where psychiatric testimony without prior warning or advice of counsel admitted
on future dangerousness in violation of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).
I" See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 551, 559 (l98P; United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-66 (1966).
" See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 41(1 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
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sified these, too, as real or physical evidence. 10 Opinion testimony
as to a defendant's mental state is the most recent class of evidence
that has presented this difficult constitutional question for the
courts.'"
C. Pre Jones Treatment of Mental State Evidence
Recently, two United States Courts of Appeals — the Fifth
Circuit and the District. of Columbia Circuit — have dealt with the
question of how courts should classify observations of a defendant's
mental state. In Gholson v. Estelle, the Fifth Circuit found psychiatric
testimony as to the defendants' mental state to be based upon con-
tent-based communications — what defendants said and failed to
say — and thus within the scope of Miranda."' In the same manner,
the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Hinckley excluded
demeanor testimony by FBI agents obtained through questioning
that had an investigatory purpose and was thus likely to elicit in-
criminating responses."' Although the facts and circumstances of
the two cases were different, the conclusions that demeanor evi-
dence is of a testimonial nature were very much the same.
in Gholson, both defendants were convicted of capital murder
by a jury in Bell County, Texas, and both received death sen-
tences.'" Two court-appointed psychiatrists, Dr. James Grigson and
Dr. John Holbrook, examined the defendants prior to trial. " 5 The
psychiatrists did not give the defendants any Miranda warnings
prior to the sessions, and Dr. Holbrook did not notify the defen-
dants' counsel prior to his examination.' 16 Although no psychiatric
testimony was introduced at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial,
the psychiatrists testified at the punishment phase that the defen-
dants were sociopaths whose violence would continue to pose a
threat to society."' Under Texas law, this testimony provided the
ILO See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
"' See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 464-69 (1981); Battie v. Estelle, 655 F,2d 692,
699-700 (5th Cir. 1981).
Gholson, 675 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1982).
"I 672 F.2d 115, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
"4 675 F.2d at 736.
'"Id. The examinations were ordered by the court "for the sole purpose of the,issue of
sanity"; and the psychiatrists were asked to determine if the defendants were competent to
stand trial. Yet the defendants raised neither the issue of sanity nor competence at trial. Id.
16 Id. at 736, 739.
17 Id. at 737.
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foundational element of future dangerousness necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty. "8
After their convictions were affirmed and their state remedies
exhausted, the defendants petitioned the federal district court for
a writ of habeas corpus to set aside the death sentences." 9 The
defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming, in
part, that the admission of the prosecution psychiatrists' testimony
at trial had violated their constitutional rights. 12" The district court
granted the motion for summary judgment, and set aside the death
sentences without affecting the convictions. 121 The State of Texas
then appealed the district court's judgment.
The Fifth Circuit considered whether the prosecution had vi-
olated the defendants' fifth amendment rights by failing to give
them a Miranda warning prior to the psychiatric examinations. 122
The state argued that the doctors' examinations and findings were
physical evidence based upon nontestimonial communications and
thus did not require a Miranda warning. The court rejected the
state's argument, asserting that the examinations in this case were
not comparable to the taking of blood and voice exemplars, and
that the state could not rely on such cases to support its arguments
for the admission of the examinations as real or physical evidence.'"
The Fifth Circuit gave two reasons for concluding that the
observations of the doctors were not real or physical evidence. First,
the court cited evidence indicating that the psychiatric evaluations
involved more than the defendants' physical reactions, and were
actually content-based. 124 This evidence included testimony by both
of the examining doctors that the responses given by the defendants
during the interviews were very important in enabling them to form
their conclusions.'" Both doctors had also drawn some conclusions
" 8 1d. at 737 & n.1. see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text For a discussion of
the Texas bifurcated system in capital cases.
"9 Gholson, 675 F.2d at 736.
120 Id. The district court held that each of the constitutional deficiencies that had existed
in Smith v. Estelle existed in this case as well, including deprivation of the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 736 (citing Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir, 1979), aff'd, 451
U.S. 454 (1981)).
1211d .
122 Id. at 739.
'28
	 See Siipra notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
121 Gholson, 675 F.2d at 740.
in Id. The court pointed to specific parts of the doctors' testimony:
Dr. Holbrook testified ... that his opinion was based in part upon what defen-
dants said to him in answer to his questions. He Further testified that he could
not reach a valid conclusion by just sitting and looking at a person who did not
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regarding the defendants' future dangerousness based upon their
lack of remorse during the examinations, citing their silence and
their refusal to admit feelings of guilt when confronted with the
crime. 128
 Thus, the "content" of communications in this case in-
cluded not only what the defendants said, but also, as a matter of
necessity, what they failed to say.t 27 Because there was evidence that
the doctors' conclusions were based upon the content of the disclo-
sures and the silence of the defendants, the court held that the
police should have given the Miranda warnings.' 28
The Gholson court also concluded that the physical reactions
purposefully elicited from the defendants were, by themselves, "tes-
timonial in nature." 29 The court returned to the reasoning of
Schmerber, which found no fifth amendment issue where the pros-
ecution seeks to obtain only physical reactions and in no way at-
tempts to compel testimony or communications from the accused."°
The court in Gholson, however, found that the examinations em-
ployed by the doctors in this case were intended to compel the
defendants' thoughts by measuring and interpreting their physical
reactions to the interrogation, thereby implicating the fifth amend-
ment."'
The appellate court found that this type of evidence differed
greatly from conclusions as to mere manner or deportment, which
may not violate the fifth amendment's protections.'" Mental state
observations obtained in the course of psychiatric examinations
were clearly different in the court's view from the various types of
permissible real or physical evidence because they went beyond
physical measurement and exposed the underlying thoughts con-
say anything .... Dr. Grigson testified that one of the phases of his mental state
examination is called the "content of thought" stage ... [in which] it is "of
particular importance the ability of that individual to discuss what they were
doing on or around about the time that the alleged offense took place."
Id.
126 Id. The Supreme Court in Estelle v.Smith reached a similar conclusion when it stated,
"Dr. Crigson's prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on statements [the defendant]
made, and remarks he omitted ...." 451 U.S. 454, 464 (1981).
'" Gholson,.675 F.2d at 740. In this case, the appellate court found the State's use of the
defendants' silence to form the basis for a death sentence to be a separate violation of the
defendants' privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 741.
1211 1d. at 741-42.
129 Id. at 740.
"" Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966)).
"' Id. at 740-41. The court found this investigatory purpose to be "calculated to subtly
extract a defendant's thoughts," and thus constitutionally unacceptable. Id. at 741.
"2 Id.
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tained in the reactions of the defendants.'" The Gholson court held,
therefore, that the prosecution had violated the defendants' rights
both by allowing the doctors to rely on the content of the defen-
dants' communications and by purposefully and improperly elicit-
ing physical reactions from them for testimonial purposes.
In United States v. Hinckley, the District of Columbia Circuit
similarly excluded evidence of a defendant's demeanor gathered by
FBI agents during a twenty-five minute questioning session in vio-
lation of Miranda.'" The D.C. police arrested and booked the de-
fendant in Hinckley after his attempted assassination of the Presi-
dent.'" The police and Secret Service stopped their questioning
upon the defendant's request to speak to a lawyer and tried to
contact the lawyer he had requested.'" When the FB1 assumed
jurisdiction of the case, however, two federal agents questioned the
defendant for approximately one-half hour despite his invocation
of his fifth amendment rights. The violation of these rights caused
the district court to suppress all evidence obtained during that
interview, including both the information procured and the agents'
testimony regarding the defendant's demeanor during the ses-
sion.' 37
Like the Fifth Circuit in Gholson, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
use of any of the content of the defendant's remarks during the
interview. 13" The court saw the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda
as establishing a "bright line" rule for law enforcement officers,
requiring interrogation to cease the moment an individual states
that he or she wants an attorney until such time as an attorney is
present. '"" Once the defendant in Hinckley asked for an attorney,
the court held that any further questioning violated his fifth amend-
ment rights.'" The government could not then use the results of
such questioning as evidence against him at trial.' 4 '
The Hinckley court also ruled that the FBI questioning clearly
demonstrated an investigatory purpose, as opposed to being a mere
background interview, thereby constituting custodial interrogation
," Id. at 739-41.
' 34 Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115,125-28 (D C. Cir. 1982).
I" Id. at 117, 119-20.
' 3 ° Id. at 119-20.
"7 Id. at 117-119.
"" Id. at 125-26.
1 " M. at 122 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 438,474 (1966)).
' 4° Hinckley, 672 12.2d, at 122.
14 ' Id. at 125-26.
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under Miranda.'" Rejecting the government's attempt to compare
the interview with a "booking" procedure, the court reemphasized
that the true value of Miranda lies in its precise and rigid rules
regarding when a defendant can and cannot be interrogated. Cre-
ating an exception for the government to conduct far-reaching
background interviews would, according to the court, weaken the
protections of Miranda and allow the government deliberately to
elicit incriminating responses from an accused." 3 The appeals court
supported its conclusions by noting the importance of the agents'
observations of the defendant as a key factor in the rebuttal of his
insanity defense." The court also noted that most background
information is relevant to determining an individual's sanity, and
such background interviews would thus necessarily allow the pros-
ecution to elicit responses that it would later wish to introduce at
trial.
The court also rejected the government's argument that a dis-
crete segment of basic identification questions at the beginning of
the interview did not violate Miranda, and that the government
could offer demeanor testimony based on this permissible seg-
ment) ." Stressing its finding that all of the questioning had an
investigatory purpose, the court could find no reason to differen-
tiate those questions that might be permissible in other circum-
stances. Moreover, the court found no way to divide demeanor
testimony into observations based on permissible, as opposed to
impermissible, questioning, but concluded that, because the entire
interview occurred in violation of Miranda, the entire process was
unconstitutional."' Thus, when a violation of a defendant's fifth
112 Id. at 123-25. According to one of the Secret Service agents, the questioning of this
defendant paralleled the standard interviewing of persons being investigated for threats
against the President or other protectees of the Secret Service: determining any remaining
danger; discovering if others are involved in the threat; and "get[ting] the feeling of who
this individual is." Id. at 123.
' 43 Id. at 124. The court also noted its agreement on this issue with Rhode Island v. Innis.
The /rods Clnirt adopted the two-pronged standard for defining cusnirlial interrogation:
"either express questioning or its functional equivalent," where any words or actions on the
part of the police ... that [they] should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response" would be such an equivalent. 446 U.S. 291,300-01 (1980).
144 Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 125.
145 a
1411 Id. at 126. The Hinckley court left open the question of whether such severability
might be possible in other cases, but gave no indication of when such other cases might
occur. Id.
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amendment rights has occurred, the Hinckley court would not admit
any demeanor testimony as separate, nontestimonial evidence.' 47
Finally, the Hinckley court also refused to admit this demeanor
evidence despite the fact that it was obtained in violation of the
defendant's rights for the limited purpose of rebutting the insanity
defense.'" The court disagreed with the government's comparison
between a compelled psychiatric examination, which the Estelle
Court had argued might be admissible as the only effective means
to counter an insanity defense, and the proposed use of lay testi-
mony obtained in violation of Miranda suggested here.H 9 The court
similarly rejected the argument that such use is like the exception
to the exclusionary rule allowing tainted evidence to he used for
impeachment purposes,'" finding no basis for extending this ex-
ception to the case of rebuttal of the substance of a defendant's
testimony.'" The court also struck down the government's final
argument, holding that the testimony of a defense expert regarding
a defendant's sanity was not the same as the defendant him or
herself testifying, thus rejecting the argument for the impeachment.
of this "testimony-by-proxy". 152 The Hinckley court concluded that
the courts should create no exception to the exclusionary rule under
Miranda to allow rebuttal of the defense of insanity by illegally
obtained evidence.'••
In summary, both the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits
have rejected the classification of observations of a defendant's de-
meanor based on unlawful qfiestioning as nontestimonial, physical
evidence. Both circuits recognized evidence based on the content
of a defendant's communications as "communicative" evidence
within the meaning and protection of Miranda. In addition, both
courts held the intentional eliciting of incriminating verbal or phys-
'" See id.
"Hid. at 132.
"1, Id. at 132-33.
15" See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971),
Hinckley, 672 17.2d at 133 n.117.
' 52 Id. at 134.
'"	 cf. United States v. Byers, 740 F.2c1 1104, 1111, 1115, 1158 (1).C. Cir, 194)
(plurality concluded fifth amendment privilege not violated when defendant raising insanity
defense is subjected to compulsory examination by court-appointed or goveriiment psychi-
atrist, and testimony on the issue of defendant's sanity may be received from those examining
psychiatrists when defendant introduced psychiatric testimony on that issue; dissent argued
privilege applies to all incriminating compelled testimonial communications, requiring at the
very least that Miranda warnings he given prior to such examinations).
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ical responses during interrogation to be a constitutional violation.
Taken together, the two decisions apparently precluded the classi-
fication of mental state observations as real or physical evidence
admissible against an accused.
II. JONES V. DUGGER AND THE NEW CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL
STATE EVIDENCE
A. The Majority Opinion
In Jones v. Dugger, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit considered the question of how to classify mental
state evidence. 154 According to the majority, the issue in Jones was
whether the prosecution may, to rebut a defendant's claim of insan-
ity, present the opinion testimony of a police officer based on the
officer's observations of the defendant during an interrogation in
violation of Miranda, 155
 In deciding that the police officer's testi-
mony was admissible,' 56 the Eleventh Circuit appears to have re-
classified demeanor testimony as real or physical evidence despite
the contrary holdings of the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits.
Defendant Oliver Jones was arrested in Miami, Florida, for
raping two women and threatening them with a firearm, and both
women identified him after he was taken into custody.'" Beginning
at approximately 3:30 a.m., Detective Raymond Holsberry ques-
tioned Jones, asking him what grade he had finished in school and
whether lie could react and write. Jones answered that he had
finished the ninth grade and could read and write, but denied
involvement in the crime until, over two hours later, he started to
cry and confessed.'" Prior to trial, the state trial court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the statements made by him to
Detective Holsberry on the ground that he had not knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The trial court also refused
to allow the prosecution to use Jones's statements to elicit expert
testimony concerning his sanity.
'" 839 E2d 1441, 1441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 91 (1988).
Id. al 1441. The trial court found that the defendant had not knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his fifth and sixth amendment rights before making statements in response to
custodial police interrogation. Id. at 1442.
' 56 Id. at 1446. The Eleventh Circuit voted 2-1 in favor of this holding. Id. at 1441.
1 " Id. at 1441.
15 ' Id. at 1442.
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The central issue at trial was the defendant's sanity.' 59 The state
sought to introduce testimony by Holsberry that Jones appeared to
be rational and well-oriented at the time of his questioning, and
that Holsberry believed Jones to have understood the difference
between right and wrong that night. The trial court held, over
defense objections, that Detective Holsberry could testify as to his
observations of the defendant on the night of questioning but could
not "go into the text of the statements."'" After affirming that he
had conversed with Jones for about three hours, Detective Hols-
berry testified as follows:
Q.[Prosecutor] Based upon what he was saying, did you
get the feeling that he understood what you were saying?
A.[Detective Holsberry] Yes . .
Q. Based upon your observations of him, and based upon
your conversations with him, were you able to form an
opinion as to whether or not he was aware of the conse-
quences of being arrested?
A. Yes, he was. At the time he was crying.
Q. Were you able to form an opinion as to whether or not
he knew right from wrong? .. .
A. Yes. I felt he knew right from wrong. 16 '
Jones was convicted and sentenced to six consecutive 100-year
terms and one consecutive 15-year term. The Florida District Court
of Appeal affirmed the verdict on appeal. After the federal district
court denied Jones's petition for habeas corpus relief, the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed that denial to determine whether the state courts'
refusal to suppress Detective Holsberry's testimony constituted a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 1 Ci2
The majority in Jones affirmed the order of the district court
denying the writ of habeas corpus, concluding that, because the
detective's testimony was based on the "nontestimonial" aspects of
Jones's behavior, the Constitution did not require its suppression. 163
According to the Jones court, the first line of authority controlling
the admission of mental state evidence consisted of those cases in
which the proffered testimony was based on the substance of the




' 62 Id. at 1441-42.
'"3 M. at 1446.
"" Id. at 1442-43.
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looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith, in which
Dr. Grigson's psychiatric opinions on the issue of future danger-
ousness were excluded. 165 The majority found it significant that the
Estelle Court had noted that the psychiatrist's diagnosis was not
based simply on his observations of the defendant, but drew largely
from statements made and remarks omitted by him during the
examination.'" In particular, the majority cited the conclusion in
Estelle that the state's use of an examination thus based on the
substance of the defendant's remarks directly implicated the fifth
amendment.
The Eleventh Circuit also drew upon its holding in Cape v.
Francis, decided more than three years earlier.' 07 The majority re-
viewed the Cape court's holding that evidence obtained during a
compelled psychiatric examination at which no Miranda warnings
were given was inadmissible at the guilt/innocence stage of a capital
trial.' 68 The majority pointed out that, in addition to concluding
that the psychiatrist's testimony was based on the substance of his
conversations with the defendant, the Cape court had also found
that it was not significant that the psychiatrist did not relate any of
the defendant's specific statements to the jury, but that the fact that
his opinion was content-based was enough. ' 6" Thus, under this line
of authority the Jones court classified any testimony based on the
statements of a defendant as content-based communications, which
were inadmissible regardless of whether the prosecutor sought to
have the statements themselves admitted."
The Jones court then described the second line of authority, in
which a range of evidence relating to the appearance and demeanor
of a defendant and to the physical properties of his or her body
may be admitted without violating the privilege against self-incrim-
ination."' The majority focused on the Schmerber distinction, under
1 "Id. Sec supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Estelle v. Smith.
1 " Jones, 839 F.2d at 1442-43 (quoting Estelle, 451 U.S. at 464-65).
'67 /d. at 1443 (citing Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 911 (1985)).
"' Id.
169 /d. As the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Cape:
it was clear that the psychiatrist had based his diagnosis of sanity on the sub-
stance of his conversations with Cape, including "the details of how he came
there" and "the details of the difficulty he was in" .... [T]here was no doubt
that the contents of' Cape's discussions ... as opposed to his mere demeanor,
influenced the psychiatrist's conclusions.
Id.
no /d. at 1942-43.
"I Id. at 1943.
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which the prosecution's use of compelled communications or testi-
mony violates the fifth amendment, whereas the use of compelled
real or physical evidence does not. 172 As examples of the types of
evidence that courts may admit under the real or physical classifi-
cation, the majority noted the Supreme Court's allowance of voice
exemplars to identify an accused,'" and the Sixth Circuit's admis-
sion of comments about a defendant's demeanor at the counsel
table during trial to establish his conduct and demeanor. 174 Thus,
the majority distinguished a separate line of cases under which
courts may admit evidence relating only to physical, nontestimonial
aspects of a defendant's person or conduct without infringing upon
his or her fifth amendment rights.
After conceding that in many cases the question of which line
of authority a particular factual situation falls under may be a close
and difficult one, the Jones majority concluded that Detective Hols-
berry's testimony fell on the "permissible," or real or physical side
of the dividing line.'" The majority's decision to place mental state
evidence into this category rested on its conclusion that Detective
Holsberry's observations were not related to the "substance" of
Jones's story, thus rendering them more like demeanor evidence.' 7"
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the district court admitted none
of the defendant's specific statements; Detective Holsberry men-
tioned no details of the crime or any part of the defendant's story
regarding it; and none of the detective's observations indicated that
his opinion of Jones's sanity was based on details of the defendant's
statements.'" In this way, the court distinguished Detective Hols-
berry's opinions from the impermissible, substance-based testimony
of Estelle and Cape, and concluded that only unprotected, nontesti-
monial aspects of the defendant's behavior were involved.'"
'2 Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966)).
175 Id. at 1443-44 (citing United States v, Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973)).
174 Id. at 1444 (citing Cunningham v. Perini, 655 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1981)(per curiam),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 924 (1982)).
175 Id. at 1444.
176 Id. at 1445.
177 1d. at 1444.
17s Id. at 1444, 1446 & 11.7. The court said:
Holsberry did testify that he had a conversation with Jones, that Jones appeared
to be well oriented, that Jones' answers to his questions were responsive, and
that Jones understood what Holsberry was saying. None of these observations
related to the substance of Jones' story; they were more like demeanor evidence,
observations that Jones was alert and comprehending,
Id. at 1445.
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The Eleventh Circuit did pause for a moment on the prose-
cutor's final question to Holsberry, "[W]ere you able to form an
opinion as to whether or not he knew right from wrong?"'" Rec-
ognizing that this question would fall within the scope of Estelle and
Cape if it required the witness to analyze the substance and details
of the defendant's story, the majority determined that this question
in the context of all the others regarding awareness and understand-
ing did not touch on the substance of Jones's story.'" The court
emphasized that the prosecutor neither prompted Detective Hols-
berry's testimony with details of the defendant's story nor asked
Detective Holsberry whether he could support his conclusions with
particular aspects of the defendant's story. Similarly, the majority
was not concerned with Detective Holsberry's testimony that Jones
was crying during the interrogation, finding that this, too, did not
implicate the substance of the defendant's statements, but only es-
tablished his alertness and corn prehension.' 8 '
The court was equally aware of the differences between its
holding and the decisions that other jurisdictions had reached on
this issue.'" First, in arriving at the conclusion that Detective Hols-
berry's testimony was not grounded in Jones's statements and thus
admissible, the court seemingly rejected the Fifth Circuit's analysis
of almost identical testimony in Gholson.'" The Jones court asserted
that what had made the questioning in Gholson inadmissible was its
deliberate purpose to elicit incriminating responses from the delen-
dants.' 84 The majority in Jones agreed with the Gholson court that
interrogation designed to produce certain testimonial reactions in
a defendant necessitates fifth amendment safeguards to preserve
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
While agreeing that such an improper examination had taken
place in Gholson, the Jones majority apparently found no such prob-
lem with the questions that Detective Holsberry asked -defendant
Jones.' 85 The majority stressed again its conclusion that Detective
Holsberry's testimony was confined to the facts of the defendant's
"9 Id.
"3° Id. at 1445-46.
1 8 ' Id. at 1445
1 " Id. at 1444-46.
152 1d. at 1444-45 & n.7. See supra notes 114-33 and accompanying text fur a discussion
of Gholson.
Jones, 839 F.2d at 1445 n.7.
185 Id. at 1444-46 & n.7.
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demeanor — that he was alert and comprehending — and did not
relate to the substance or details of his story. 186 Thus, the court
found that the line between questioning designed to elicit testimony
and that which elicits only demeanor evidence separated this case
From Gholson. ' 87
Next, the Jones court addressed the apparently inconsistent
decision in United States v. Hinckley to suppress the opinion testimony
of FBI agents based on interrogation in violation of the defendant's
Miranda rights. 188 The majority acknowledged that the Hinckley
court's distinction between allowing the use of unlawfully obtained
lay testimony to rebut a defendant's insanity defense and compelling
a psychiatric examination to provide the prosecution with the only
effective means of countering an insanity defense was a valid dis-
tinction.' 89 After agreeing to this difference, however, the majority
returned to its analysis of protected testimonial communications as
opposed to unprotected nontestimonial behavior of a defendant,
concluding that this analysis was the proper constitutional standard
to apply.' 9" Accordingly, the Jones court held that Detective Hols-
berry's testimony need not be suppressed, because the detective had
based his opinions only on nontestimonial aspects of the defendant's
behavior.
B. Judge Clark's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Clark strongly rejected the
majority's decision to analogize Detective Holsberry's testimony to
"Id. at 1445.
I" Id. at 1445 n.7. The court referred to the criteria suggested in Smith a. Estelle as a
means or marking the dividing line:
Had Dr. Grigson drawn his conclusion from Smith's manner or deportment,
his attention span ur facial expressions, a strong argument niight be made that
he gathered only inomestimuniall evidence .... If Dr. Grigson had been ana-
lyzing only the patterns of the defendant's speech, his grammar, organization,
logical coherence and similar qualities, the question would be closer but arguably
the fifth amendment would still not apply.
Id. at 1444-45 n.7 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 704 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 451
U.S. 454 (1981)).
1 " Id. at 1446. Sec supra notes 1134-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hinckley.
' 8"Jone.s, 839 E2c1 at 1446.
' 90 Id. Moving away from Hinckley, the court stated "nevertheless we are convinced that
the more important difference is between testimonial Coln munications, which are protected
by the fifth amendment, and nontestimonial aspects of a defendant's behavior, which are
nut." Id.
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other types of real or physical evidence.'"' After examining the
available precedent both within the Eleventh Circuit and in other
jurisdictions, judge Clark concluded that the Supreme Court as well
as certain lower courts had explicitly sought to prohibit such an
analogy.' 92 According to Judge Clark, a careful examination of the
decisions on this issue revealed that the majority incorrectly inter-
preted and applied the standards for determining whether evidence
is testimonial or real or physical for fifth amendment purposes, thus
rendering its classification of Detective Holsberry's testimony as real
or physical evidence incorrect as well.'`' 3
judge Clark returned to the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle
v. Smith to locate the proper constitutional standard-on the issue of
mental state evidence.' In particular, he referred to the Estelle
Court's conclusion that the fifth amendment may not apply to evi-
dence that is neither related to some communicative act nor used
for its testimonial content.'`'' According to Judge Clark, the Estelle
Court rejected the examining psychiatrist's testimony under that
standard, because it could not have been based solely upon his
observations of the defendant. 16 Judge Clark concluded that such
testimony obtained through psychiatric examinations will never
qualify as the type of real or physical evidence admissible under the
Schmerber distinction.' 97
Continuing his analysis, Judge Clark argued that application of
the Estelle standard also demonstrated that the question of a defen-
dant'S "demeanor" for purposes of establishing his or her sanity
cannot be equated with the kinds of physical, nontestimonial com-
munications derived from Schmerber.'• According to Judge Clark,
the Estelle holding requires the suppression of such testimony when-
ever conclusions as to demeanor are based on an interview consti-
tuting an unlawful interrogation. To support this conclusion, Judge
Clark relied in part on the Eleventh Circuit's previous decision in
Cape v. Francis to exclude psychiatric testimony as to a defendant's
sanity and criminal responsibility based on the substance of re-
19 ' Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
' 92 Id. at 1446-51 (Clark, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 1446 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark called the majority "misguided in its
attempt to parse the testimony or Detective Holsberry so as to render him a source of real
evidence." Id.
"4 Id. at 1496-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 1446-47 (Clark,J., dissenting) (citing Estelle v, Smith, 45I U.S. 454,463 (1981)).
"6 Id. at 1447 (Clark, J., dissenting).
197 /d, (Clark, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 1447 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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sponses given by the defendant without prior Miranda warnings.' 99
Judge Clark stressed that the Cape court excluded the psychiatrist's
testimony despite the fact that be did not testify directly to any of
the defendant's specific statements and that the court did not even
know whether the defendant had discussed the crime at all during
the examination.
Judge Clark then considered the majority's attempt to distin-
guish the present case from Cape by explaining that it was the
content of the defendant's discussions, rather than his "mere de-
meanor," that influenced the psychiatrist in Cape.'" Judge Clark
attacked this distinction as exposing the flawed standard that the
majority applied: that testimony is not "based on" testimonial com-
munication unless it relates to the actual substance of what a defen-
dant said. 20 ' Unlike this analysis by the majority, the Estelle standard
endorsed by Judge Clark would exclude testimony either related to
some communicative act or used for its testimonial content. 262 Ac-
cording to Judge Clark, this standard would properly render all of
Detective Holsberry's observations of Jones's "demeanor" inadmis-
sible."
19'.' Id, (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Cape v. Francis, 741 1 7.2d 1287, 1293-94 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S, 911 (1985)).
2 "" Id. at 1447-48 (Clark, J., disseming)(emphasis omitted).
2"I Id, at 1448 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that this was the explanation
fur the majority's ability to reach its holding in spite of the fact that:
(liven the questions which the prosecutor posed to Detective Holsberry, it is
simply inconceivable that he did not base his testimony on the petitioner's
"communicative acts." The prosecutor asked Detective Holsherry to draw his
responses specifically from the "conversations" between the two men and from
"what the defendant I was saying."
Id. at 1447-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 1448 (Clark, J., dissenting). In the same manner, Judge Clark objected to the
way in which the majority framed the issue in the case, claiming Detective Holsberry's
testimony was based on his "observations" without reference to the conversations that he had
with Jones. Id. at 1450 n.7 (Clark, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 1450-51 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark compared this case to the Battle
case, which analyzed psychiatric testimony as to flume dangeroUSI1CSS based on a compelled
examination using the Estelle standard. Focusing on the conclusion to exclude the testimony,
Judge Clark explained:
Baffle "was not simply 'required to use his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic' but instead was required 'to speak his guilt' by responding to Dr.
Patterson .,s test questions".. , . This was so regardless of the fact that Dr. Pat-
terson did not describe in any way Baltic's responses or statements. The key to
the decision in Battle was that the defendant was compelled, through communi-
cative acts, to assist the State in proving elements necessary to support the
imposition of a crintinal punishment. The same reasoning applies here, since
the State had availed itself of unlawfully obtained communications to support
a guilty verdict.
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Judge Clark concluded his dissent with a return to the concerns
expressed in Schrnerber for distinguishing between testimonial and
nontestimonial corn munications. 204 He emphasized the need under
the Schmerber distinction for fifth amendment safeguards whenever
police or prosecutors conducted an interview with the purpose of
eliciting testimonial responses, whether verbal or nonverbal. Judge
Clark found these concerns especially relevant in this case, where
Detective Holsberry interrogated Jones as part of a criminal inves-
tigation, with the purpose and the duty to elicit information from
the defendant regarding his alleged crime."5 In addition, he
strengthened his argument regarding Detective Holsberry's pur-
pose by noting that this case involved lay testimony, not psychiatric
testimony. Thus, according to the dissent, because the detective had
no training in interpreting personality disorders, he must have had
some other reason for interrogating Jones. 266
Finally, Judge Clark urged the Eleventh Circuit to adopt the
holding of the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Hinckley
and exclude all lay testimony as to a defendant's "demeanor" re-
sulting from an unlawfully conducted interrogation."' He agreed
with the Hinckley court's holding that.the original Miranda violation
taints all demeanor testimony in such cases, requiring the court to
exclude it. Applying Judge Clark's standard, wherever such consti-
tutional error is found, the court would then determine whether
this error was harmless. 208 Because Detective Holsberry's testimony
was a key factor in persuading the jury as to Jones's sanity in this
case, Judge Clark concluded that the trial court's error could not
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 20• Thus, he insisted that
the majority should have granted the defendant's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
Id. at 1448 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing 13 oil h'. 655 F.2d 694, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1981)) (citations
omitted).
2(4 /d. at 1450 (Clark, J., dissenting).
ens Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark used some of the language of the Ghol.s.on court
indicating "'al neutral and detached observation of a person's physiological characteristics is
something altogether different from an examination directed and calculated to subtly extract
a defendant's thoughts. - Id. at 1451 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting Gholson v. Estelle, 675
F.2d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1982)).
206 Id. at 1449-50 (Clark, J., dissenting).
2" 7 Id. at 1451 (Clark, J., dissenting).
20" Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
2'"' Id. at 1453 (Clark. J., dissenting).
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
A. The Pre-Jones Classification of Mental State Evidence
The majority in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jones v. Dugger
concluded that observations of a defendant's mental state constitute
physical, nontestimonial evidence which the state may compel from
a defendant without violating the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Prior to that decision, however, both the Fifth Circuit in Gholson
v. Estelle and the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Hinckley considered this same issue and reached the opposite result.
Both circuits reached this result by applying the two standards
originating in Schmerber for determining whether evidence should
be classified as testimonial or communicative, or real or physical
within the scope of Miranda. These two Schmerber tests are: first,
whether the witness testified to the actual substance of a defendant's
disclosures or based his or her testimony on those disclosures; or
second, whether the witness intentionally elicited the verbal or non-
verbal reactions from the defendant for the purpose of extracting
essentially testimonial responses. Both the Fifth and the District of
Columbia Circuits concluded that mental state observations failed
under each of these tests to qualify as merely physical, nontesti-
monial evidence and thus excluded such evidence.
In Gholson, the Fifth Circuit held that mental state observations
could not be classified as real or physical evidence under either of
the Schmerber standards:21 ° The Court placed great importance on
the testimony of both examining psychiatrists, who admitted that
the defendants' responses during the examinations were necessary
to the formation of their conclusions. 2 " Despite these admissions,
the state in Gholson argued that the psychiatric evaluations merely
drew upon the physical features exhibited by the defendants, with
no more communicative content than a blood sample or presence
in a lineupY' 2 The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected these arguments as
21 " Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734, 739-42 (5th Cir. 1982). See ,supra notes 122-33 and
accompanying text.
2 " Gholson, 675 F.2d at 740.
212 1d. at 739. The court in Smith v. Estelle had explained that certain features exhibited
by a defendant during a psychiatric examination may constitute only real or physical evidence;
these features included deportment, expressions, attention span, and coherence. 602 F.2d
694, 704 (5th Cir. 1979), riff 'd, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The psychiatrists in Gholson, however,
had admittedly relied upon the content of the defendants' communications to reach their
conclusions, thus exceeding that permissible scope. 675 F.2d at 740. See supra note 187 for a
discussion of Smith a, Estelle.
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"misplaced," emphasizing that the doctors not only used the state-
ments made by the defendants, but also drew conclusions as to their
lack of remorse from their silence in response to certain ques-
tions. 213 The Gholson court correctly recognized that these "de-
meanor observations" cannot be separated from the compelled tes-
timonial response of a defendant on which they are based. For that
reason, the Gholson court held that such testimony is not the sort of
physical, nontestimonial evidence sought to be admitted under the
Schmerber distinction.
The Gholson court also found that the psychiatrists had ob-
served the physical reactions of the defendants with the purpose of
procuring testimonial evidence, thus failing to meet the second
Schmerber test of real or physical evidence. 2 " Unlike a neutral ob-
servation of an accused's physical characteristics, the doctors in
ChoLon had assessed the defendants' reactions in order to expose
their underlying thoughts. 215 Dr. Holbrook, for example, testified
that in response to the defendant's silence, he employed the tech-
nique of "catching the dummy," whereby he continued the inter-
rogation and evaluated the defendant's reactions to him and his
questions as responses to the questioning. This purposeful extrac-
tion of physical reactions for their testimonial content is precisely
the type of self-incriminating evidence that Miranda sought to ex-
clude, and the Fifth Circuit identified it as such by applying the
constitutional standards as outlined in Schmerber.
In Hinckley, the District of Columbia Circuit also held that
mental state observations are not the type of real or physical evi-
dence that police or prosecutors may compel from a defendant
without violating his or her constitutional rights. 216 Although the
government offered a variety of explanations of the interrogation
which would remove it from the scope of Miranda, the Hinckley
court recognized that the true purpose was without doubt to elicit
incriminating testimony from the defendant. 217 The attempt to clas-
sify the interrogation as a "booking" procedure failed because the
police had booked the defendant prior to the arrival of the FBI
agents, and the questions far exceeded the scope of such a proce-
dure. 218 Nor did the interrogation qualify as a nontestimonial back-




216 United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115,125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
217 1d. at 122-25.
216 Id. at 122-23.
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ground interview, because the FBI agents were aware that the de-
fendant's sanity was likely to become an issue at trial and many
details regarding his background would be valuable to the govern-
ment in rebutting the insanity defense:2 ' 9
The mental state observations in Hinckley were admittedly based
on the FBI agents' interrogation of the defendant, 22" and for that
reason alone the court should have excluded them tinder Sc. hmerber
as testimonial evidence. The Hinckley court, however, was more
disturbed by the government's attempt to classify testimony ob-
tained by law enforcement officials during a criminal investigation
as mere "demeanor" evidence not intended to yield incriminating
responses."' Even if certain individual questions sought only back-
ground information, the court could not separate those from the
constitutionally impermissible investigatory purpose that pervaded
the entire interview. It is difficult to see how such an FBI investi-
gation could not be the type of custodial interrogation from which
Miranda sought to protect the individual rights of defendants, and
the District of Columbia Circuit properly excluded such "de-
meanor" evidence as violative of the constitutional protections em-
bodied therein.
Thus, the Schmerber Court's two tests constitute the appropriate
constitutional analysis for identifying those types of evidence that
are nontestimonial and, as such, beyond the reach of the fifth
amendment privilege. Both the Fifth and the District of Columbia
Circuits analyzed the admissibility of mental state observations ob-
tained during unlawful custodial interrogation, and both circuits
concluded that such observations fail to qualify as real or physical
evidence under either test. Rather, each court held that unless the
police or prosecutors employ the proper procedural safeguards,
demeanor evidence represents exactly the type of self-incrimination
that Miranda was designed to prohibit, and the evidence will be
inadmissible under the fifth amendment.
B. The Reclassification by the Jones Court
In Jones v. Dugger, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals con-
ducted its own- analysis of the admissibility of unlawfully obtained
mental state evidence. The police officer's testimony in closely
20 Id. at 123-25.
220 Id. at 125.
221 Id. at 125-211.
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resembled the evidence that the prosecutors offered in both Gholson
and Hinckley. In addition, the Jones court's constitutional analysis —
the two tests of Schmerber— appeared to be the same tests that those
other jurisdictions had applied. Nevertheless, the Jones majority in
fact redefined these standards and the manner of their application.
This improper interpretation and application of the constitutional
standards led the Jones majority to classify incorrectly mental state
observations as real or physical evidence, thereby depriving the
defendant of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
The Jones court did recognize that the question of the admis-
sibility of the evidence depended on whether Detective Holsberry
based his testimony on the testimonial or communicative aspects of
the defendant's statements during the three-hour custodial inter-
rogation. 222 Turning to the available authority, the majority con-
cluded that a line of cases under Estelle and Cape prohibited the
state's use of evidence against a criminal defendant that is based on
the substance of his statements made during an unlawful custodial
interrogation. 223 The court also examined the line of cases that had
evolved since Schmerber identifying the permissible compulsion of
real or physical evidence from a defendant. Although there may
have been no precedent for the court's inclusion of demeanor evi-
dence on its list of permissible physical evidence under Schmerber,224
the Eleventh Circuit appeared at least to have identified the first
Schmerber test.
Unfortunately, however, the majority misapplied the underly-
ing constitutional standards of this test for identifying testimonial
or communicative evidence. The Jones court identified three reasons
for concluding that Detective Holsberry's observations were non-
testimonial: first, the trial court excluded all of the. defendant's
specific statements; second, Detective Holsberry gave no details of
the crime or the defendant's story regarding it in his testimony;
and third, nothing about the detective's observations indicated that
his opinions were "grounded in the details of ]ones' statement." 225
Therefore, the Jones majority found Detective Holsberry's testimony
222 Jones v. bugger, 839 F.2d 1441,1444 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 91 (1988).
22'
	 at 1442-43.
See id. at 1443. The court described the line of cases under Schtnerber holding "that
there is a range of evidence relating to the appearance and demeanor of a defendant and
to the physical properties of a defendant's body that does not implicate the fifth amendment."
Id.
225 Id. at 1444.
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to be demeanor evidence regarding the defendant's alertness and
comprehension, and unrelated to the substance of Jones's responses'
to the detective's questions. 226
Even a cursory examination of the demeanor testimony that
the trial court did admit into evidence demonstrates the error of
the Jones majority in concluding that such evidence could be "un-
related" to Jones's communications or testimony. At two separate
points, the prosecutor specifically instructed Detective Holsberry to
respond to the questions "based upon" his conversations with Jones
and what Jones said during those conversations.227 Although De-
tective Holsberry may not have related the substance of Jones's
statements in his testimony, the questions required him to evaluate
those statements and rely on them to form his opinions and conclu-
sions. Under the definition of "substance-based" employed in every
other case applying the Schmerber test, this testimony would clearly
qualify as communicative evidence based on the substance of the
defendant's responses during interrogation, thus requiring exclu-
sion.
The Jones majority was essentially unconcerned with the fact
that its definition of "substance-based" evidence differed from that
of other courts. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished its holding from
its earlier holding in Cape by declaring that in that case, the contents
of the defendant's statements, as opposed to his mere demeanor, formed
the basis for the psychiatrist's conclusions. 228 In the same manner,
the majority concluded that the psychiatric observations of the de-
fendants in Gholson were substance-based, as well as purposely elic-
ited testimonial evidence, 229 whereas in Jones the detective observed
only the physical characteristics of the defendant. In light of the
questions and answers recorded by the trial court, however, it is
impossible to see any difference between Detective Holsberry's ob-
servations and these others; all were equally based upon the sub-
stance of the defendants' responses, and all should be equally in-
admissible.
The majority's distinction of Gholson also suggests the need to
analyze Detective Holsberry's testimony under the second Schmerber
226 Id. at 1445.
227 Id. at 1442. The first of these questions was, "[biased upon what he was saying, did
you get the feeling that he understood what you were saying?"; and the second was, "[biased
upon your observations of him, and based upon your conversations with him, were you able
to form an opinion as to whether or not he was aware of the consequences of being arrested?"
Id. Detective HolSberry responded in the affirmative to each of these questions. Id.
528 1d. at 1443.
229 Id. at 1444-45 n.7.
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test, examining whether the interrogation purposefully elicited the
defendant's reactions to provide testimonial evidence. The Jones
court never actually reached the issue of whether the purpose of
Detective Holsberry's questioning was to compel incriminating re-
sponses or reactions.'" Instead, the focus remained at all times on
the eventual use of the defendant's responses to provide observa-
tions of his demeanor rather than to relate the substance of his
remarks.2" The majority's failure to invoke this second constitu-
tional standard for classifying evidence ,also helps to explain, the
conflict between the Eleventh Circuit's holding and that of other
jurisdictions.
Application of the second Schmerber test to the Jones interro-
gation exposes exactly the investigatory purpose requiring exclusion
of the evidence under Miranda. After his arrest and while in the
custody of the police, a detective interrogated Jones for approxi-
mately three hours. 232
 As a result of this interrogation, Jones, after
denying involvement in the crime for over two hours, broke down
in tears and confessed. 233
 The clear purpose of this persistent and
difficult interrogation was to obtain incriminating evidence from
the defendant, who the trial court found had not knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Like the FBI's interrogation
of the defendant in the Hinckley case, the officer had a purpose and
a duty to uncover incriminating evidence from the defendant.'"
This purpose is constitutionally impermissible under the second
Schmerber test.
Moreover, the detective later used the incriminating responses
obtained during the interrogation to discredit Jones's insanity de-
fense. When asked by the prosecutor whether, based on his obser-
vations and conversations, the detective could form an opinion
about Jones's awareness of the consequences of being arrested,
Detective Holsberry replied that he believed the defendant was
aware because laJt the time, he was crying." 235
 The majority con-
cluded that this testimony did not exceed the scope of physical
demeanor evidence, but only added to the evidence of Jones's alert-
ness and comprehension. 236
230 See id. at 1445-46.
231
 Id. at 1446.
"? Id. at 1441-42.
239 Id,
234
 See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115,124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
235 Junes, 839 F.2d at 1442.
231 Id. at 1445 n.8. The majority compared this nontestimonial evidence to an opinion
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The majority's ability to reach this conclusion rested on its
failure to consider the evidence in light of the second Schmerber test,
instead relying solely on the substance-based standard for distin-
guishing testimonial from real or physical evidence. In the final
paragraph of the opinion, the Jones majority recognized a "possible
conflict" between its decision and the holding in Hinckley. 237 Rather
than confronting this conflict, however, the majority found that the
Hinckley court had held only that lay testimony may not be used
generally to rebut an insanity defense, and that the proper consti-
tutional standard rested on the testimonial nature of the evidence. 238
By ignoring the analysis of purposeful interrogation required by
the Hinckley court, the majority was then able to reiterate its holding
that the demeanor evidence did not implicate Jones's testimony or
communications and did not require exclusion.
Thus, the Jones majority incorrectly applied the constitutional
standards to the question of the admissibility of unlawfully obtained
mental state observations. The majority redefined the "substance-
based" test for testimonial evidence in such a way that courts may
admit virtually any evidence falling short of the actual statements
of a defendant against him or her at trial. In addition, the majority
never even addressed the question of the intent of the interrogation
to purposely elicit testimonial responses from a defendant in direct
violation of the Miranda protections. The majority's improper anal-
ysis failed to uphold the fifth amendment protection embodied in
Miranda, and allowed the defendant's self-incriminating testimony
to Form the basis for evidence that the prosecutor used to convict
him.
C. A Recommendation for the Proper Treatment of Mental State
Evidence
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Clark correctly pointed out
the flaws in the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Jones. 23" Judge Clark
examined the majority's conclusion that testimony is not "based on"
a defendant's communications unless it relates the actual substance
of his or her statements. Recognizing that this standard would allow
that offered Jones's crying as evidence that he felt sorry For what he had done, stating that
in the latter case the observation would be testimonial. Id.
2" Id. at 1446.
"8 Id.
"" Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). See supra notes 191-209 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the tote's dissent.
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much incriminating testimony to be compelled from a defendant
in violation of his or her fifth amendment rights, Judge Clark urged
the Eleventh Circuit to adopt the two tests derived from Schmerber
and thereby join the other circuits in classifying mental state obser-
vations as testimonial evidence that cannot be compelled from a
defendant without the proper fifth amendment safeguards.
Although Judge Clark located these constitutional standards in
the Estelle case, he argued for the same two considerations originally
discussed in Schmerber. According to Judge Clark, courts may only
consider evidence to be real or physical if it neither relates to a
defendant's communicative acts nor is used for its testimonial con-
tent. 24 " Under these tests, Judge Clark concluded that the court
could not possibly classify Detective Holsberry's testimony as real
or physical because he had both directly based it on Jones's state-
ments during the unlawful interrogation and deliberately obtained
it in order to incriminate the defendant. 24 ' Judge Clark argued that
evidence used to establish a belief about a defendant's sanity was
completely different from blood test results and handwriting sam-
ples, which relate only to the physical properties of a defendant's
body. 242
Judge Clark is correct in his belief that such evidence is not of
the type that the Schmerber Court meant to include when it first
drew the line for admissible real or physical evidence. There are
certainly situations in which "demeanor" evidence will consist solely
of information related to the defendant's physical characteristics
and obtained with no intent to compel incriminating testimonial
responses. For example, a defendant may repeatedly yawn and close
his eyes or fall asleep while being interrogated, leading the police
officer or psychiatrist to conclude that he or she was tired at the
time of the interview. Under the two tests of Schmerber, a court
would likely classify this observation of the defendant's demeanor
as real or physical evidence, implicating none of the defendant's
testimonial capacities.
When the observations in question relate to the defendant's
"mental state," however, they necessarily implicate a different set of
the defendant's characteristics. In order to form an opinion regard-
ing the mental state of an accused, the accused must communicate
24° Id. at 1446-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 1449-51 (Clark, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 1447 (Clark,]., dissenting).
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some information, whether verbal or nonverbal, from which the
interrogator can draw conclusions. As one of the doctors who ex-
amined the defendants in Gholson testified, he could not determine
sanity or competence by sitting and looking at a person who did
not say anything. 243 In these situations, nonverbal reactions are
equally important to help the examiner formulate his or her opin-
ion. Regardless of whether the interrogators are psychiatrists like
in Gholson and Estelle or lay witnesses like in Hinckley, they can reach
no conclusions about a defendant's mental state except those drawn
from the accused's testimony or communications.
This determination is the same one made by Judge Clark in
his dissenting opinion. After concluding that the Supreme Court
had never intended that an analogy be drawn between mental state
observations and purely physical evidence implicating no fifth
amendment concerns, Judge Clark stressed that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit should adopt the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in
Hinckley and exclude lay testimony as to a criminal defendant's
sanity whenever it results from an unlawful interrogation. 244 Be-
cause he also believed that Estelle had made it clear that psychiatric
examinations cannot be equated with real or physical evidence, 245
Judge Clark was effectively recommending that the courts should
categorically exclude mental state evidence as testimonial evidence
absent effective procedural safeguards. This recommendation is the
proper result under the original policies of Miranda and Schmerber
to prohibit the compulsion of any testimonial or communicative
evidence from a defendant likely to result from a coercive custodial
interrogation. Future courts faced with the question of the admis-
sibility of unlawfully obtained mental state evidence should follow
this recommendation and exclude the mental state observations.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided in Miranda
v. Arizona to put an end to the physically and psychologically abusive
techniques of police incommunicado interrogation. By prohibiting
the use at trial of any testimony or communications compelled from
a criminal defendant without effective procedural safeguards, the
243 Cliolson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1982).
244 Jones, 839 F.2d at 1451 (Clark, J., dissenting),
"5 Id. at 1447 (Clark, j., dissenting).
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Miranda Court hoped to eliminate the various police techniques that
had been developed and refined over the years to undermine the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Although the
Court recognized in Schmerber v. California that certain types of real
or physical evidence may not fall within the scope of the fifth
amendment's protections against compelled testimony or commu-
nications, this distinction was intended to be narrowly construed by
future courts in order to preserve the constitutional privilege. Ac-
cordingly, both the Schmerber Court and later courts classifying ev-
idence as testimonial or real or physical applied strict constitutional
standards: only that evidence that is neither related to a defendant's
communicative acts nor used for its testimonial content may be
classified as real or physical evidence.
When the circuit courts first considered the nature of mental
state observations, therefore, they evaluated their testimonial or
communicative nature under these constitutional standards. In
doing so, both the Fifth and the District of Columbia Circuits con-
cluded that the mental state observations that prosecutors attempted
to characterize as physical "demeanor" evidence were in fact inher-
ently testimonial. Both circuits acknowledged that it would be im-
possible for an interrogator to reach conclusions regarding a defen-
dant's mental state without considering his or her responses — or
lack thereof — during the interrogation, thus violating the first
Schmerber test. In addition, the purpose of the interrogators to use
the interviews in order to glean such mental state evidence from
the defendants made their use under the second Schmerber test
impermissible as well.
By failing to apply the proper constitutional standards to the
question of mental state observations, the Eleventh Circuit in Jones
v. Dugger incorrectly classified this evidence as real or physical under
the Schmerber distinction. The single standard applied by the Jones
court — that testimony is not impermissibly based on testimonial
communications unless it relates to the actual substance of what a
defendant said — cannot adequately protect a defendant from the
types of unconstitutional police techniques that the Miranda Court
sought to abolish. Instead, by narrowing the definition of "sub-
stance-based" testimony under the first Schmerber test and neglecting
even to apply the second Schmerber test, the Jones court has opened
the doors for police, psychiatrists, and prosecutors to obtain vast
amounts of' incriminating testimonial evidence from criminal defen-
dants under the guise of "observing their demeanor." The Supreme
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Court should act immediately to reaffirm the appropriate consti-
tutional standards for drawing the distinction between testimonial
or communicative and real or physical evidence, and return evi-
dence of mental state observations obtained in violation of Miranda
to the proper side of the filth amendment dividing line.
JULIE A. HARDY
